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This study explores the commonality and variation of non-regular workers’ struggles in 
Korea by drawing upon 30 major dispute cases which have taken place since 2000. The 
common features of those struggles are characterized as defensive claim-making, employer’s 
determined union-busting, protracted struggle outside workplace, transgressive protest 
repertoire, reliance on external solidarity, third actors’ mediation, dispute recurrence and 
union’s organizational instability, and protest against large firms. At the same time, the 
non-regular workers’ struggle shows a great deal of variation in outcomes (i.e. bargaining 
gains and union membership) and key attributes (i.e. repertoire, duration, timing) of those 
struggles. The different outcomes of the struggles are closely correlated with the attitude of 
regular workers unions as well as the extent of external solidarity toward non-regular 
workers’ struggles, with some contingencies (i.e. public meaning of the struggle, the content 
and timing of related legal decision by the government or the court, the industry union’s 
involvement, and claimants’ self-sacrificing protest) creating outliers from this patterned 
relationship. The outcome of non-regular workers’ struggles is also correlated with their 
repertoire and duration in a polarizing form like the spirals of moderatization (better 
outcome – low-risk repertoire – shorter duration) and extremization (worse outcome – 
high-risk repertoire – longer duration). 
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Introduction
[Episode 1] On August 26th, 2013, two Jaeneung Education Workers Union 
activists came down from the bell tower of Hyewha Cathedral after their 202-
day aerial protest, as the company and the union agreed to conclude the 
dispute by reinstating dismissed union members and restoring the existing 
labor contract. The dispute, which started in December 2007 as the union 
protested against the company’s unilateral wage reduction, is recorded as the 
longest, lasting 2,076 days. Since March 2014, however, the union has 
re-launched a street sit-down protest since the company has not accepted the 
union’s core demand for the guarantee of living wages and union activities.    
[Episode 2] On August 8th, 2013, two Hyundai Motor Non-regular 
Workers Union activists stopped their 296-day aerial protest at a transmission 
tower near the Ulsan auto plants. They demanded that the company follow 
the Supreme Court’s decision and employ all contracted workers as regular 
workers. In July 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that Hyundai Motor violated 
the Dispatched Workers Protection Law, requiring the reinstatement of the 
aggrieved contracted workers to regular status. Their aerial protest, which 
triggered a number of solidarity campaigns, including the Hope Bus, led by 
labor-civil society organizations, gained little. In April 2014, tripartite 
bargaining started, involving HMC management, regular workers and non-
regular workers unions, but has not been productive due to inter-union 
distrust as well as ever-conflicting views between the unions and 
management.   
[Episode 3] On December 30th, 2013, when the company announced 
sudden closing of its production plant, the Kiryung Electronics Worker 
Union lost its workplace. In November 2010, the union won the 
reinstatement of dismissed members after its 1,895-day struggle (2005-2010), 
including the union president’s 94-day hunger strike and aerial protest at the 
plant tower. The union’s struggle attracted a lot of active support from civil 
society organizations and netizens, and led politicians to pressure the 
company into accepting the union’s demand. The company’s plant closing 
drove the union to re-launch another painful struggle. 
The above three episodes offer a glimpse of how non-regular workers in 
South Korea (hereafter Korea) have fought desperately in the 21st century. 
Their struggles, which last for hundreds of days and even longer than two 
thousand days, are targeted at employers’ tyrannical behaviors, such as forced 
wage cuts, unilateral disconnection of employment contracts, discriminatory 
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and illegal employment practices, willful disregard of the court decisions and 
government directives, and union suppression by violence. Those desperate 
and protracted struggles are closely related to precarious employment status 
and insufficient protective institutions given to non-regular workers.
In Korea, political democratization in 1987 triggered the subsequent 
explosion of “Great Labor Struggles” and massive organizing of democratic 
labor unions. As a consequence, Korean labor unions became internationally 
known for their militant activism through the late 1980s and mid-1990s. At 
the time, they were viewed as building a new front in the global labor 
movement along with other democratizing countries, such as Brazil, South 
Africa, and the Philippines (Silver 2003). The 1997 economic crisis, however, 
changed the contour of labor militancy in Korea. In the pre-1997 period, 
union militancy was characterized as being on the offensive, in that unions, 
freed from the authoritarian state’s interventionist control, actively resorted to 
strike action for forging labor citizenship in the workplace and enhancing 
employment conditions through wage increases. By contrast, the post-1997 
period has seen union militancy turn to the defensive in two ways. On one 
side, the existing unions, comprised of regular workers, have undertaken 
militant reaction to employers’ downsizing and the government’s neoliberal 
restructuring. On the other, non-regular workers, who proliferated sharply 
after the economic crisis and suffered from precarious and discriminatory 
employment conditions, have organized their own unions and engaged in 
desperate protest action to defend their well-being and labor rights from 
employers’ exploitative treatment and oppression, as illustrated by the above 
episodes. Particularly during the post-1997 period, as many regular workers 
unions have moved away from labor insurgency and acquired a complacent 
attitude toward job security and economic gains, non-regular workers’ 
struggles have become symbolic of new militant activism to resist the 
neoliberal capitalist regime.
Some recent English literature pays attention to the militant activism 
that Korean non-regular workers and their unions have demonstrated in the 
era of neoliberal globalization (Chun 2009, 2013; Lee 2015). This literature 
commonly provides a contextualized explanation of non-regular workers’ 
militancy by underscoring not only their precarious employment and 
discriminatory working conditions, but also the inability of the existing labor 
laws and labor unions to resolve their problems. It is certain that this analysis 
offers a valid account of why Korean non-regular workers have become so 
militant. This is evidenced by the fact that dispute action staged by non-
regular workers’ unions tends to be not simply desperate but also fierce, 
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fueled by their resentment and hostility to employers. At the same time, the 
literature overlooks the variation in non-regular workers’ militancy, for 
instance, in terms of mobilized forms and outcomes of their militant 
activism. In fact, some non-regular workers’ unions chose a more extreme 
protest repertoire for their collective action than others. Some succeeded in 
achieving their demands, whereas others failed. Thus, this study seeks to 
capture and account for a “patterned” variation of non-regular workers’ 
struggles as well as their commonality, thereby contributing to a broader 
theoretical understanding of labor movement literature as per the 
mobilization of precarious workers on the margins.  
For this research objective, the event data concerning dispute action 
taken by non-regular workers unions during the post-1997 period were 
collected from three Korean labor journals, the Daily Labor News, Non-
regular Labor, and Labor and Society, covering a period from 1998 until May 
2014. Among labor disputes led by non-regular workers and their unions, 30 
major cases are selected for comparative analysis, taking into account the 
degree of public attention given to the dispute, the extent of the impact that 
the dispute has had over employment relations and labor policy, and the 
availability of case information.1 The profile of the 30 cases is summarized in 
[Appendix A].
Literature Review of Union Militancy
According to Dubin (1973), union militancy is conceptualized as the union’s 
aggressive willingness to use economic and physical force in gaining 
collective bargaining ends.2 Historically, workers and their unions expressed 
their militancy in various forms, comprising covert and overt collective 
actions (such as sick-outs, slow-downs and work-to-rule) to inflict damage 
on employers. Along with the institutionalization of industrial relations, 
strike action, which became the most effective means for unions to pressure 
1 The unit of analysis in this study is the non-regular workers union engaging in a variety of 
protest actions against employers, rather than a struggle episode produced by the union or 
individual workers or activists involved in the protest action. It should be noted that some of these 
cases are not included in the annual report of labor disputes reported by the Minister of 
Employment and Labor, because of either their illegal dispute actions or their non-worker status.  
2 Reflecting on the Korean industrial relations context, Yoon and Yang (2002) propose a 
definition of union militancy as the union’s uncompromising attitudinal propensity to resort to 
physical force for achieving its demands and resolving labor-management issues rather than seeking 
to make a compromise with the employer in a moderate and pragmatic manner. 
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employers by work stoppage, has been regarded as the typical form of union 
militancy. In this vein, much industrial relations literature has measured the 
union’s strike-proneness or actual strike action for the empirical analysis of 
union militancy and attempted to figure out what factors lead unions or 
workers to become militant.
Of course, not all unions are militant. Kelly (1996) distinguishes the 
union’s attitudinal propensity between militancy and moderatism in five 
aspects (i.e. ideological vision, goal-setting, de/mobilizing strategy, 
institutional vehicle, and action repertoire).3 His dichotomous comparison 
appears to be too simplistic to capture the diverse character of union 
activism, presuming that militancy and moderatism are of both a discrete 
and monolithic nature. As a matter of fact, many unions are located 
somewhere between the two extremes of militancy and moderatism, and 
their attitude might change over time. More importantly, when delving into 
militant activism, we find that there exists a great deal of variation among 
militant unions in several aspects. 
Firstly, the goals and motives of union militancy may differ, depending 
on whether those unions engage in militant action to make gains, or to avoid 
losses.4 That is, the militant action for gain could be classified as offensive 
militancy, whereas that for preventing loss as defensive militancy. We can 
infer that the intensity of militant action by the defensive militancy groups 
tends to be stronger than by that of offensive militancy, since the first group is 
more desperate to defend their labor rights and basic well-being from 
employers’ infringements, compared to the latter group, which tries to make 
more economic gains. The difference of union militancy between these two 
groups might be influenced by a variety of factors, such as their positional 
power in the labor markets (Beale 2003), subjective capacity and conditions 
of action resource mobilization (Cress and Snow 1996), labor-capital power 
balance (Beale 2003) and political-economic opportunity structure at the 
3 According to Kelly (1996), militant unions have a confrontational ideological inclination and 
uncompromising attitude toward employers, and tend to mobilize members and resort to dispute 
action against employers to push their demand on a formalized bargaining scheme. By contrast, 
moderate unions have a cooperative and compromising attitude toward management, mainly using 
non-bargaining style consultations and hardly mobilizing the rank and file members for dispute 
action.
4 Moreover, Dixon et al. (2004) separates workers’ motives for taking militant action into union-
centered action and solidarity-centered action; the former denotes that “workers engage in direct 
action based on available organization, resources, and leverage in the employment relationship,” 
while the latter means “workers engage in protest because it resonates with their shared experiences 
and in some instances with a legacy of collective action.”
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macro level (Lee forthcoming). 
Secondly, the choice of struggle repertoire varies among militant unions. 
Some militant unions stick to the contained repertoire of collective action, 
and some others invent more transgressive ones. McAdam and his colleagues 
(2001, pp. 7–8) make a theoretical distinction between the contained and 
transgressive forms of protest repertoire: the former refers to collective action 
in which actors in protest employ well-established means of claim making, 
whereas the latter denotes protest action to which newly self-identified actors 
adopt an innovative repertoire.5 McAdam (1986) also proposes a distinction 
of union activism by a combination of cost and risk.6 According to his 
distinction, some episodes of union militancy are more costly and riskier 
than others. For instance, the extreme repertoire of protest action (i.e. 
occupation or blockade demonstrations, aerial protests, and illegal strikes), 
requires participants’ law-breaking, physical sacrifice or confrontation with 
employers and the state authority, so it can be regarded as assuming a high 
risk. By contrast, the mild protest repertoire, such as legal strike actions, 
petitions, and peaceful rallies, which is executed in a contained form and 
based upon massive support of constituents and/or outside actors, poses a 
low risk. As Briskin (2007) indicates, the shape of union militancy has 
substantially changed in the transforming terrain of labor-management 
relations wrought by neo-liberal globalization and labor market 
restructuring. A new repertoire of collective actions, going beyond the 
boundary of the workplace and calling to the public, has become of 
increasing significance to the unorganized and atypical workforce. For 
instance, some unions in Anglophone countries (i.e. SEIU and HERE) have 
made strenuous efforts to organize precarious workers, or the Precariat, 
which was created by employer-driven externalization and casualization of 
employment relations, and have employed transgressive protest repertoires, 
such as bridge blockades, public rallies, sit-down protests, and solidarity 
campaigns with civil society groups, rather than resorting to the contained 
repertoire of strike action. As such, the activated forms of union militancy 
5 McAdam and his colleagues (2001) differentiate the transgressive repertoires of contention from 
the contained one, as follows: while the latter offers the advantage of being accepted and familiar to 
claimants without requiring special resources or a willingness to incur costs and take great risks, the 
former has the advantages of surprise, uncertainty, and novelty.
6 According to McAdam (1986, p. 67), cost refers to “the expenditure of time, money and energy 
required of a person engaged in any particular form of activism,” while risk means “the anticipated 
dangers — whether legal, social, physical, financial, etc. — of engaging in a particular type of 
movement activity.” 
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have diversified, ranging from conventional strike action to a variety of non-
conventional repertoires, as unions’ strategic reaction to their shrinking 
organizational base and employers’ aggressive dominance in the context of 
neoliberal globalization. 
Thirdly, the outcomes of union militancy vary. Militant action is not 
guaranteed to achieve what the union desires. Some forms of militant action 
are more effective in obtaining desired outcomes for the aggrieved than other 
forms. Even the same militant action might provide different results for 
unions, depending upon contextual contingencies. Reflecting the varying 
outcomes of militant action, another distinction could be drawn from union 
militancy, characterized as productive, or potent, militancy versus 
unproductive, or impotent, militancy. In order to examine how productive 
union militancy is, two indicators are useful for measuring the outcomes: the 
extent of demands achieved by the union’s action and the change in union 
membership, as proposed by Cho (2011). For example, some instances of 
militant action produce the best outcomes by fully achieving the union’s 
demands and increasing the union’s membership, whereas the worst 
instances are opposite – no gain of demands, membership loss or even 
dissolution of the union. Surely, there exist various combinations of 
bargaining gains and membership changes between the best and the worst 
instances. 
The existing literature of industrial relations and labor studies offers a 
great deal of empirical analysis and theoretical inference for explaining 
union/worker militancy or strike-proneness, but pays little attention to 
varieties of union militancy. In light of this research vacuum, the next 
sections shed light on the commonalities and differences in union militancy 
by focusing on major cases of non-regular workers’ struggles, and, in 
particular, trying to figure out the patterned variation of non-regular workers’ 
militancy by exploring noticeable correlations between the outcomes and key 
attributes of those struggles. 
Overview of Non-regular Workers Unions’ Struggles 
The issues of non-regular labor have gained growing visibility in the post-
1997 period, as various groups of non-regular workers have engaged in a 
series of desperate protest actions against employer-imposed discrimination 
and precariousness, attracting public attention (Chun 2013). The first dispute 
action that non-regular workers took in the post-1997 crisis was reported to 
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be the contracted workers’ protest against the closing of the Sabuk mining 
station in January 1998. The first union, formed by non-regular workers, was 
the Daegu Construction Union, formed in February 1998 by around 800 
daily workers, who suffered from job loss, unilateral wage cuts and extension 
of unpaid working hours during the economic crisis. The union organization 
and protest actions by non-regular workers have since steadily diffused into 
manufacturing, private service, transportation, and the public sector. As a 
result, the relative share of non-regular workers’ struggles in the total disputes 
has risen from 0.7% in 1998 to around 20% in the late 2000s, as displayed in 
[Figure 1].7 It is noteworthy that the National Council of Non-regular Unions 
Solidarity, formed in October 2004, launched a variety of joint campaigns for 
demanding legislative reforms and labor policy to protect the non-regular 
workforce and provide active assistance to individual non-regular workers’ 
unions in disputes. Although the organization of non-regular workers unions 
7 The data of labor disputes, which are yearly collected and officially published by the Ministry of 
Employment and Labor, underestimates the frequency of labor disputes to some extent, as this data 
excludes dispute action launched by some groups of non-workers, who don’t have legal employment 
status like dependent contractors and dismissed employees and often engage in illegal dispute 
action. 
Source.—Ministry of Employment and Labor, Labor Dispute Case Report, each year (2001-
2002, unreported)
Note.—Joint strike action by regular and non-regular workers is included in the category of 
non-regular workers union’s struggle. 
Fig. 1.—Trends in the Number and Share of Non-regular Workers’ Disputes
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has continued to proliferate, the union density of non-regular workers is only 
3.0% (as of August 2013), which is much lower than that of regular workers 
(17.0%).8 
Now, we turn to the 30 major cases for examining commonality and 
variation of non-regular workers’ struggles. [Table 1] provides an overview of 
the 30 cases to be analyzed. The cases are diverse in terms of employment 
types and industrial sectors, although the contracted employment and 
manufacturing sectors have respectively the largest share of each category. In 
addition, 16 cases took place during the liberal governments period (2000-
2007) led by President Kim Dae-jung and Rho Moo-hyun, whereas five cases 
happened during the conservative governments period (2008-), led by 
President Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye. The remaining nine cases are 
carried over from the liberal governments to the conservative governments. 
The duration of the struggle ranges from 41 days (KWCWS) to 2,076 days 
(Jaeneung Education), with five sporadic-recurrent cases. There are 11 cases 
of protracted struggles, lasting over 300 days, and seven cases of relatively 
shorter struggles, lasting fewer than 100 days. The unions involved in the 30 
cases harness not only a conventional repertoire (strike action), but also a 
variety of unconventional struggle tactics, such as workplace blockades 
(including entrance attacks and sales boycotts), hunger and hair-shaving 
protests, occupation protests, aerial protests, street campaigns (including one-
man picketing, demonstrations, candlelight rallies, street sit-down protests, 
signature collections, and three-step one-bow parades), and even suicide 
protests. The reasons for union’s actions vary from union suppression or 
denial to massive dismissal, outsourcing, economic and institutional gains, 
guarantee of regular employment status, and discrimination.    
Commonalities of Non-regular Workers Unions’ Struggles 
Drawing upon these 30 cases, a common pattern of contentious dynamics is 
identified: claim-making and union organizing by non-regular workers → 
employer‘s oppression → union’s struggle/protest action → union-
8 Note that the union density of the entire workforce was 10.3% in 2012. The official data of labor 
disputes and union density is released by the Ministry of Employment and Labor every year. 
However, the Ministry’s industrial relations data does not include that of non-regular workers. 
Instead, the Bureau of National Statistics has conducted bi-annual (March & August) surveys on 
employment conditions (including union membership) of the non-regular workforce, from which 
the union density of non-regular and regular workers is estimated.  
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management compromise → recurrent confrontation (because of employer’s 
union suppression). This overall process appears to bear some similarity to 
that of regular workers unions. But, substantial differences are observed at 
each stage (Kim 2010). Firstly, non-regular workers unions make primarily 
defensive claims, in contrast with regular workers unions’ offensive claims, 
which demand economic gains and enhancement of working conditions 
(particularly during the period of 1987-1997). Non-regular workers’ claims 
are chiefly to protest against employers’ arbitrary dismissal, outsourcing and 
illegal treatment, including union suppression.9 In other words, the essence of 
the non-regular workers’ struggle is a desperate campaign to defend their 
basic wellbeing and labor rights from employers’ inhumane infringement and 
the lack of institutional protection (Kim and Kim 2006). 
Secondly, when non-regular workers organize a union and make their 
claims, employers tend to ignore or destroy the union, thereby escalating 
union-management relations into an intense dispute. Employers have 
harnessed a variety of means (i.e. dismissal and blacklisting of union of 
leaders and activists, mobilization of private [scabs] or public [riot police] 
force, and legal claims for damages and criminal charge against the union’s 
dispute actions) to oppress the organizing and protest action of unions. The 
employers’ determined stance to bust non-regular workers unions is closely 
associated with their primary motivation to use non-regular labor in order to 
avoid unionization altogether. 
Thirdly, confronted with employer’s repressive reactions, the struggle 
actions of non-regular workers unions differ sharply in some aspects from 
those of regular workers unions. A noticeable difference is that the struggles 
staged by non-regular workers unions tend to be much more protracted than 
those of regular workers unions. The fact that the average length of labor 
disputes taking place during 2000s is 34.3 days evidences how lengthy the 
struggle of non-regular workers unions, lasting hundreds or thousands days, 
has been.10 Another difference is that non-regular workers unions have 
9 As shown in [Table 1], claims raised in ten cases are about economic and institutional gains. 
However, the nature of these claims are essentially defensive, since they demand that employers and 
the state guarantee their minimum living standards threatened by low wages and the lack of 
institutional protection. Moreover, according to Cho (2011), the non-regular workers unions, whose 
members are in precarious employment conditions, are structurally disadvantaged in organizational 
sustainability and resources, so that they are to a certain extent defensive in the entire process of 
these contentious dynamics, including claim-making.     
10 The averaged length of labor dispute during 1990s is only 21.6 days. This implies that the 
length of labor dispute in 2000s has extended by 58.8% (12.7 days), largely owing to the protracted 
struggles by non-regular workers unions as well as and laid-off regular workers. According to the 
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devised and harnessed an unconventional repertoire of various struggle 
tactics to pressure employers, and sometimes the state, in addition to 
conventional strike action. According to the classification of McAdam et al. 
(2001), the repertoire of struggle action by non-regular workers is 
transgressive rather than contained. As shown in Table 1, most of their 
protest action is extra-legal and beyond institutional regulation. It is also 
noteworthy that the transgressive repertoire of struggle action by non-regular 
workers unions is largely carried out outside their workplaces, unlike the 
conventional form of strike action, which typically takes place within 
workplaces. Moreover, the struggle of non-regular workers unions is often 
characterized as a public and dramatic protest (Chun 2009), attracting and 
relying upon broad solidarity support from labor and civil society 
organizations, and even netizens in some instances.11 These distinct features 
of non-regular workers’ struggles—lengthiness, transgressiveness, exteriority 
(going outside of the workplace), and external reliance—are mutually related, 
and all reflect the weakness of structural and associational power12 that those 
precarious workers have under the neoliberal regime (Lee forthcoming). The 
precarious employment conditions of non-regular workers make vulnerable 
their structural and associational power vis-à-vis employers. In particular, 
non-regular workers unions have great difficulty in recruiting members 
among unorganized workers, who are scared of job loss resulting from union 
participation. As a result, the unions’ associational power and action 
resources, mainly drawn from their membership, are very weak. Those 
unions’ dispute actions within the workplace are not strong enough to stop 
production or business, so that they fail to force employers to accept their 
claims. Instead, their protest action is very vulnerable to employers’ 
repression. Therefore, the non-regular workers unions tend to go outside the 
workplace to undertake their struggle for a protracted period beyond the 
Ministry of Employment & Labor’s Labor Dispute Case Report as per the period of 1998-2012 
(excluding 2001-2002), the averaged length of non-regular workers’ disputes is 61.2 days, longer by 
33.3% than that of regular workers‘ disputes (46.0 days).
11 Among the 30 cases, 20 non-regular workers unions won strong solidarity support from labor 
and civil society organizations, while six unions received only weak support from outside. The 
exemplar cases of nationwide solidarity support given to non-regular workers’ struggle are the 
“Hope Buses” for the contracted activists of Hyundai Motor in the aerial protest, “Punky Outsiders” 
for female janitors in the occupation struggle of Hongik University, and “Together in Rains” for 
contracted workers’ protest at Kiryung Electronics.  
12 According to Wright (2000), the structural power derives from the location of workers within 
the economic system, while the associational power comes from the formation of collective 
organizations of workers. 
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reach of employers’ control. They also seek to force employers to surrender 
by organizing solidarity protests involving external labor and civil society 
organizations as well as pressure of sympathetic public opinion, as alternative 
means to supplement their weak associational power. 
Fourth, given the protracted and intense confrontation between non-
regular workers unions and employers, third actors (i.e. Ministry of Labor, 
the head of local government, representatives of civil and religious 
organizations, and politicians) play a significant role13 in the mediation and 
resolution of such disputes in many cases (Kim 2010). However, the 
agreements, made after the protracted struggle and through third-party 
mediation, are often broken or ignored by employers, having adamant intent 
to oppress non-regular workers unions. Employers’ anti-union behavior 
drives the unions to re-engage in protest action. Regular workers unions 
typically obtain organizational stability in membership and institutionalized 
relationships with employers after the initial confrontation. By contrast, a 
majority of non-regular workers unions have over time exposed 
organizational instability and even been dissolved due to employers’ 
intolerance and oppression, despite the fact that their legal status was 
13 In half of the 30 cases, third actors got involved in mediation to resolve the disputes. 
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recognized in the first labor contract, following the strenuous process of 
union organizing and protest action (Cho 2011). [Figure 2] displays the 
extent to which the membership of Hyundai Motor Non-regular Workers 
Union has fluctuated since its birth, clearly illustrating the organizational 
instability that non-regular workers unions are commonly experiencing.
Another notable commonality of the case struggles is that all but 
Kiryung Electronics, which is the only case of a small firm (employing less 
than 300 workers), are against large firms.14 Unions of temporary and 
contracted/dispatched workers fought against large and extra-large firms, 
such as Hyundai Motor, Samsung Electronics, Korail, and Korea Telecom, 
while those of dependent contractors and daily laborers engaged in strike 
action against large client firms in the sectors of construction and 
transportation. This implies that non-regular workers’ union organizing and 
labor disputes do, to a large extent, take place at large firms, or in connection 
with large firms, and this also implies that protest action is far beyond the 
reach of non-regular workers in small firms, who form the vast majority of 
the precarious workforce (84.8% as of August 2013).
Variations of Non-regular Workers Unions’ Struggles
Non-regular workers’ struggles not only have common features, but also 
embrace a good deal of variation in their outcomes and styles. Thus, we move 
on to an analysis of the varieties of non-regular workers’ struggles, focusing 
on outcomes and key attributes.15
Figure 3 demonstrates how the outcomes of the 30 non-regular workers’ 
struggles disperse, in terms of bargaining gains and union membership. The 
outcomes are widely distributed in an upward diagonal direction, ranging 
from no gain and union dissolved (0-0) to full gains and union enlarged 
(3-3). A noticeable factor affecting the differing outcomes of non-regular 
workers’ struggles is the attitude that regular worker unions in the same 
14 It should be noted that the case struggles, selected for this study, took place at large firms, 
thereby drawing more public attention, than unselected cases which mainly did at small firms in 
such segments as manufacturing, building maintenance/cleaning, general services, and construction. 
15 At the risk of simplifying the complicated stories of the struggle cases, the outcomes and 
concerned attributes of those struggles are codified into a form of categorical variables, in order to 
find out and explain the patterned variation among the 30 cases. [Appendix B] offers a codified 
summary of the outcomes and some attributes of the struggle cases. 
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workplace show toward the struggle of non-regular co-workers.16 As 
illustrated in the box plots of [Figure 4], the regular workers unions’ active 
support for non-regular workers’ struggles plays a significant role in 
producing positive results for both labor contract and union membership. On 
the contrary, the regular workers union’s indifference, and particularly, 
interference, has a negative impact on the outcomes of the latter group’s 
struggle. This finding reaffirms that status division among regular and non-
regular workers does preclude their joint/solidarity protest action, as 
indicated by Dixon (2004). At the same time, since non-regular workers 
unions lack their own resources to mobilize for protest action against 
employers’ oppression, their struggle is heavily influenced by the regular 
workers unions’ attitudes.17 In [Figure 4], there are several outliers that 
deviate from this patterned correlation between the struggle outcome and the 
regular workers union’s attitude. For instance, New Core and E-Land 
produced disappointing outcomes in bargaining and union membership 
despite lengthy joint strike action launched by regular and non-regular 
workers. This negative result might be explained by the fact that these two 
cases were regarded as sort of proxy labor-business confrontations taking 
place after the legislation of the Fixed-term and Part-time Workers 
Protection Law in late 2006. In this context, considering the overall interest of 
the business circle, employers, who were inherently tough anti-unionists, 
more firmly than ever opposed the unions‘ demand for regular jobs, even in 
the face of strong solidarity support from outside as well as regular and non-
regular workers’ joint strike action. By contrast, three cases show opposite 
results; they made positive bargaining gains, in spite of the regular workers 
union’s destructive interference. In the three cases, there existed positive 
contingencies such as a union member’s suicide protest (Korea Workers’ 
Compensation and Welfare Service), the government’s decision against the 
client firm’s illegal use of contracted labor (Carrier Kwangju plant), and the 
industry union’s active involvement (Coscom), helping the concerned non-
regular workers unions overcome the regular workers union’s interference. It 
16 It is also noteworthy that non-regular workers’ struggles under the settings where regular 
workers are not unionized produced relatively better outcomes than those under the conditions that 
regular workers’ unions showed either negative interference or indifference toward these struggles, 
as demonstrated in [Figure 4]. 
17 At the same time, in that regular workers union’s indifference produced a wide dispersion of 
outcomes, it should be considered that other factors, such as external solidarity and third-party 
moderation, might have different effects on what non-regular workers’ struggles gain, even in the 
common context that marginal workers are given little support from the regular workers union. 
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should be noted that while unions in those three cases experienced 
substantial membership loss (KWCWS), or union dissolution (Carrier and 
Coscom), they had some bargaining gains. This implies that the effect of 
regular workers unions’ (negative) attitudes toward non-regular workers’ 
struggles somehow differs in bargaining gains and membership. The regular 
workers union’s interference or indifference has an absolutely damaging 
impact on the non-regular workers union’s membership or organizational 
sustainability, whereas other contingencies nullify its negative effect over 
bargaining gains.    
External solidarity, which denotes support that non-regular workers 
obtained from outside, is another key factor impacting the struggle outcome. 
Like the regular workers union’s attitude, external solidarity, coming from the 
national center, industrial unions or federations, civil society organizations, 
progressive political parties, and in some cases students and netizens, is a 
significant supplement to those non-regular workers unions suffering from 
their poor struggle action resource. As displayed in [Figure 5], both 
bargaining gains and union membership increase, as the external solidarity 
given to non-regular workers’ struggles goes from “no support” to “strong 
Variation of Non-regular Workers’ Struggle 
 Differing Outcomes of NRW Union’s Struggle 
(0x0): 4
KT tepms, GM Daewoo 
Changwon, Hynix Magner 
chips, KTX attendants 
(3x3): 5
Keumho Tire, Ulsan plant, 
Seoul University Hospital, 







KIa Motor Kwangju, Hyundai 
Hisco, Hongik University
(2x1): 7
KWCWS, Pohang plant, 
Kiryung electronics, Donhee 
auto,  E-land, Jaeneung 









GM Daewoo Bupyeong, 








: 3 enlarged, 2 sustained, 1.5
up &
 dow
n, 1 shrunken,0 dissolved Bargaining gain: 0 no,  1 limited, 2 partial, 3 full
 Fig. 3.—Outcomes of Non-regular Workers Unions’ Struggles in Terms of 
Bargaining Gains and Organizational Membership
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support.” In many instances, non-regular workers’ struggles disclose their 
inhumane and precarious employment conditions and produce a public 
drama to resist and challenge employers’ exploitative treatment by gaining 
broad solidarity support from outside (Chun 2009). In some cases (i.e. 
Hyundai Hisco, Ulsan plant construction, Hongik University, Korea Workers’ 
Compensation and Welfare Service, and Coscom), where there exists no 
 Fig. 4.—the Effect of Regular Workers Union’s Attitude over Struggle Outcomes
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regular workers union or, if any, an indifferent/interfering one, the public 
drama enabled non-regular workers to make substantial gains in bargaining 
and membership. In some other cases, however, non-regular workers’ 
struggles create a different kind of public drama, characterized as a 
 Fig. 5.—The Effect of External Solidarity over Struggle Outcomes
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nationwide proxy of labor-capital or union-state confrontation concerning 
the legal and policy regulation of non-regular employment. In the cases 
where such class warfare took place, like Hyundai Motor, Ulsan plant, Korail 
attendants, E-land, and New Core, those disputes are observed to become 
more protracted and result in limited outcomes.  
It is also observed that the outcome of non-regular workers’ struggle is to 
a certain extent correlated with some attributes of their struggle, such as 
repertoire, duration and timing. As displayed in [Figure 6], non-regular 
workers unions, which harness only two or three kinds of action repertoires, 
is better in both bargaining gains and union membership than the union 
mobilizing more than three kinds of action repertoires.18 In other words, the 
number of protest repertoires has a negative correlation with the outcome of 
non-regular workers’ struggles. This implies that the stronger the union is, 
the fewer struggle repertoires it resorts to for achieving what it desires. 
Similarly, the number of high-risk protest repertoires harnessed by the non-
regular workers union is negatively associated with the outcome, as 
illustrated in [Figure 7].19 This means that the more high-risk repertoires a 
non-regular worker union relies upon, the worse the outcomes. Reversely 
speaking, the union unable to obtain its desired results with low-risk 
repertoires of protest action tends to mobilize high-risk struggle repertoires, 
but with little gains. 
From this finding that the number and intensity of protest repertoires is 
inversely correlated with the outcome of non-regular workers’ struggles, we 
may infer that the extreme form of union militancy by non-regular workers is 
likely to be self-destructive, an indomitable but impotent struggle. When 
non-regular workers do not resolve their problems by the conventional and 
low-risk repertoires of protest action, they cannot but choose the more high-
18 There exist two outliers—Coscom and Cargo truckers—which are located outside the 
patterned correlation between the outcome and the number of repertoires. Coscom and Cargo 
truckers mobilized four kinds of protest repertoires. Nonetheless, the former made full bargaining 
gains, particularly aided by the Ministry of Labor’s decision against the employer’s illegal use of 
dispatched labor as well as the industry union’s active involvement, and the latter has sustained its 
organizational cohesiveness by demonstrating formidable leverage in its collective action since the 
first strike action in 2003.    
19 Taking into account the risk protest repertoires posed to struggle participants in terms of bodily 
and financial damages as well as legal punishment (McAdam 1986; Yoon 2010), the struggle 
repertoires harnessed by the 30 cases, are classified into two categories, high-risk and low-risk: the 
former includes blockades, occupation protests, aerial protests, and suicide protests, while the latter 
is comprised of legal strike action, hair-shaving and hunger strikes, and street campaigns. Note that 
the relationship the low-risk repertoire has with the outcomes of struggle action is not entirely clear, 
unlike the high-risk repertoire.
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risk repertoire to overcome employer’s oppression; however, their militant 
action tends to result in the decreasing participation of union members, who 
must leave in order to make a living, and the few remaining members then 
turn to a desperate but isolated “Sisyphus-style” struggle (Chun 2013). As 
such, the extremization of protest repertoires is an inevitable choice by non-
regular workers unions lacking organizational power and action resources, 
 Fig. 6.—Outcomes and Repertoires of Non-regular Workers’ Struggles
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but often leads to a vicious circle of union militancy.20     
20 It should also be noted that the extreme self-sacrificing action repertoires, such as hunger 
strike, aerial (or sky) protests and suicide protests, in some instances (i.e. Hyundai Heavy Industry; 
Hyundai Mipo Ship-building; Jaeneung Education; Samsung Electronics Service) saved the union 
and made significant gains, like reinstatement of dismissed members and regularization of 
employment status, under the very unfavorable conditions. The self-sacrificing protest, which 
 Fig. 7.—Outcomes and High-risk Repertoire of Non-regular Workers’ Struggles
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As illustrated in [Figure 8], non-regular workers’ struggles, lasting longer 
than 300 days, tend to make fewer gains in both bargaining and membership 
originated from Chun,Tae-Il’s self-immolation in 1970, has since become the extreme repertoire of 
micromobilization for labor activists and union members in order to call to the “hearts and minds” 
of the people (Kim 2008).  
 Fig. 8.—Outcomes and Duration of Non-regular Workers’ Struggles
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than those of under 300 days. A protracted struggle implies that a non-
regular workers’ union cannot put the struggle to an end in a shorter period, 
owing to the lack of sufficient force to pressure the employer to accept their 
claims. The negative correlation between the duration and the outcome of 
non-regular workers’ struggles might be closely linked to the inverse 
relationship between the number and intensity of struggle repertoires and 
outcomes. The non-regular workers union which failed to obtain its desired 
gains by conventional protest action is more likely to resort to a more 
extreme or high-risk struggle repertoire, but with little productive outcome. 
As a result, the dispute tends to become further protracted.21 In contrast, the 
non-regular workers union, which succeeded in mobilizing members for 
powerful protest action, causing severe damage to the employer’s production 
or pubic image (i.e. the Kia Motor Hwasung plant and Hongik University 
janitors), made considerable gains in bargaining and membership, with fewer 
high-risk actions and a shorter duration.      
Besides, when further exploring the patterned correlation among the 
attributes of non-regular workers’ struggles, a couple of interesting points are 
observed. Firstly, the nature of contentious issues is closely related with such 
key features of those struggles, such as the outcomes, repertoire, and 
duration. Concretely speaking, the issues of dismissal and outsourcing are 
likely to lead to a more high-risk repertoire, a more protracted dispute, and 
the worse outcomes in bargaining gains and union membership, whereas the 
economic and institutional issues tend to involve the less high-risk repertoire 
and the shorter struggle with better outcomes. This evinces that employer-
driven massive dismissal and outsourcing drives non-regular workers into a 
painful warfare to desperately protest against employer’s injustice and for 
their survival, in sharp contrast to the union-led “getting more” game. In 
many instances of this warfare, however, the unions harnessed a variety of 
struggle repertoires, including the extreme and high-risk ones, but still failed 
to block employers’ decisions. Secondly, the duration and outcomes of non-
regular workers’ struggles appear to be significantly associated with the 
timing of the struggle, which reflects the effect of the political-economic 
situation. The duration and outcome of our struggle cases are respectively 
shorter and better during the liberal governments (2000-2007) than under 
the conservative governments (2008-present). This result reaffirms that the 
21 A glimpse of relationship between repertoire (number and intensity) and duration of non-
regular workers’ struggles by box plot confirms that the two attributes are positively correlated with 
each other, though in a moderate form.
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political opportunity structure plays a significant part in shaping the process 
and outcome of non-regular workers’ struggles, in that the liberal 
governments, taking a pro-labor policy, provided the more favorable 
opportunity condition for non-regular workers’ collective action than the 
pro-business conservative governments do.22
Conclusion
This study explores the commonality and variation of non-regular workers’ 
struggles in Korea by drawing upon 30 major dispute cases which have taken 
place since 2000. The exploratory analysis offers a grounded inference to 
shed light on the nature of militant activism produced by precarious workers 
at the margin of labor markets, albeit the paper’s limited statistical precision. 
The common features of those struggles are characterized as defensive claim-
making, employer’s determined union-busting, protracted struggles outside 
the workplace, transgressive protest repertoires, reliance on external 
solidarity, third actors’ mediation, dispute recurrence and union’s 
organizational instability, and protest against large firms. 
At the same time, the non-regular workers’ struggles show a great deal of 
variation in the outcome (i.e. bargaining gains and union membership) and 
key attributes (i.e. repertoire, duration, timing) of those struggles. The 
different outcomes of the struggles are closely correlated with the attitude of 
regular workers unions as well as the extent of external solidarity toward non-
regular workers’ struggles, with some contingencies (i.e. public meaning of 
the struggle, the content and timing of related legal decision by the 
government or the court, the industry union’s involvement, and claimants’ 
self-sacrificing protest) creating outliers from this patterned relationship. The 
outcome of non-regular workers’ struggles is also correlated with their 
repertoire and duration in a polarizing form like the spirals of moderatization 
(better outcome – low-risk repertoire – shorter duration) and extremization 
(worse outcome – high-risk repertoire – longer duration). 
Such patterned correlation between the outcome and those attributes 
(including regular workers union’s attitude and external solidarity support) of 
22 The 16 cases of non-regular workers’ struggles happened under the liberal governments, 
compared to the five cases under the conservative governments and the nine cases carried over 
between the two regimes. This fact might be well-aligned with the political opportunity structure 
perspective. In addition, the 2008 global financial crisis would also become an unfavorable structural 
context constraining non-regular workers’ struggles.     
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non-regular workers’ struggle reaffirms the significance of resource 
mobilization, in particular for precarious workers’ protest action. As 
underscored by McCarthy and Zald (1977), the mobilization of relevant 
resources is a sine qua non factor to determine the course and character of 
social movement and labor activism.23 As per the non-regular workers union, 
which lacks sufficient resources for its protest action, the mobilization of 
resources from regular workers unions as well as external solidarity actors is a 
key factor to shape the outcome and style of a union’s struggle against the 
employer. The existing literature of resource mobilization presumes that 
unions or workers who can mobilize sufficient resources are more likely to 
engage in militant action (Dixon et al. 2004). This premise, however, does not 
fit with our finding that non-regular workers who do not have enough 
resources to mobilize their protest action tend to move on to the more 
extreme struggle repertoires, though with little success. The protracted and 
high-risk struggles by non-regular workers standing on the margins is 
ceaselessly fuelled by those workers’ desperate desire to change, as well as 
their deep resentment against, the precarious working life and deprived labor 
citizenship in neoliberal Korea. In this light, non-regular workers’ militancy 
might primarily have been driven by the oppression or threat structure of a 
non-standardized labor market since the late 1990s, which contrasts with 
regular workers’ militancy, geared to more gains in wages and working 
conditions, under the political opportunity structure created by the 
democratization of 1987. At the same time, the fact that the outcome and 
duration of non-regular workers’ struggles are to some extent correlated with 
the timing of the struggle evidences some noticeable effects that political-
economic opportunity structure has over those workers’ protest actions. 
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